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ABSTRACT 
 
Promotion Determinants in Corporate Hierarchies: 
An Examination of Fast Tracks and Functional Area* 
 
This article estimates a dynamic reduced-form model of intra-firm promotions using an 
employer-employee panel of over 300 of the largest corporations in the U.S. in the period 
from 1981 to 1988. The estimation conditions on unobserved individual heterogeneity and 
allows for both an endogenous initial condition and sample attrition linked to individual 
heterogeneity in demonstrating the relative importance of variables that influence promotion. 
The role of the executive's functional area in promotion is considered along with the 
existence and source of promotion fast tracks. We find that while the principal determinant of 
promotions is unobserved individual heterogeneity, functional area has a high explanatory 
power, resulting in promotion probabilities that differ by functional area for executives at the 
same reporting level and firm. No evidence is found that an executive's recent speed of 
advancement in pay grade has a causal impact on in- sample promotions after conditioning 
on the executive's career speed of advancement. For high-level executives, fast tracks 
appear to result from heterogeneity in persistent individual characteristics, not from an 
inherent benefit in recent advancement itself. 
 
 
JEL Classification: C33, M5, M51 
  
Keywords: promotion, fast track, functional area, dynamic discrete choice 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Michael Bognanno 
Department of Economics 
Temple University 
1301 Cecil B. Moore Ave. 
Ritter Annex 873 (004-04) 
Philadelphia, PA 19122 
USA 
E-mail: bognanno@temple.edu 
 
                                                 
* We are grateful to several seminar participants at the 2010 ASFE annual congress in Paris and at the 
2012 EEA annual conference in Málaga for useful comments. 
1 Introduction
This paper considers the promotion of high-level American executives. A
dynamic reduced-form model of promotion outcomes is estimated using an
employer-employee panel of over 300 of the largest corporations in the U.S.
in the period from 1981 to 1988. The model demonstrates the relative im-
portance of variables that influence promotion, examines the existence and
source of fast tracks in promotion while conditioning on unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity in promotion and allowing for both an endogenous initial
condition and sample attrition linked to individual heterogeneity. We also
consider the role of the executive’s functional area (accounting, marketing,
etc.) in promotion.
This paper contributes to earlier investigations of promotion in the per-
sonnel economics literature and in the management literature. We corrobo-
rate findings on promotion regarding the effect of hierarchical level and the
importance of unobserved heterogeneity in the personnel economics literature
(Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994a, 1994b, Lazear, 1992). Firm studies
in both literatures find evidence of promotion fast tracks but do not empiri-
cally determine the source of fast tracks. By analyzing the role played by the
speed of past advancement on promotion outcomes, we are able to evaluate
implications from models of job assignment that regard whether the source of
promotion fast tracks is simply superior worker ability (persistent unobserved
individual heterogeneity to the researcher) or whether rapid promotion has
its own positive causal impact on worker promotability due to the potential
signal it reveals to the labor market of high worker ability. Findings on the
potential signaling role of promotions are appearing in the personnel eco-
nomics literature (DeVaro and Waldman 2012, Bognanno and Melero 2012).
At the same time, investigating the impact that functional area may have
on promotion outcomes contributes to the management science literature on
this question (Vroom and MacCrimmon 1968, Forbes and Piercy 1991) and
is of general interest.
One major finding in this paper is that, when promotion is defined as
a change in job title resulting in a higher pay grade, the most influential
determinant of promotion by far is unobserved individual heterogeneity. De-
terminants of less importance are functional area, career advancement speed
(measured as the executive’s inflation adjusted pay grade midpoint divided
by the executive’s age as of the executive’s first appearance in the sample),
human capital (age and education), firm variables (profits, sales and size),
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tenure and newcomer status at the firm and reporting level in the firm. Rates
of promotion diminish with advancement in level and age. Career advance-
ment speed, on which unobserved individual heterogeneity is conditioned, has
a positive effect on promotion probabilities but the recent speed of advance-
ment has no significant effect. This indicates that fast-tracks in promotion
result from heterogeneity in persistent individual characteristics and not from
a causal effect that recent advancement might have if it reveals a signal to
the outside labor market of high worker ability. Promotion probabilities are
negatively correlated with sample attrition.1 Overall, the promotion process
can be characterized as a static discrete outcome model in which all serial
correlation can be accounted for by persistent individual unobserved factors.
The next section of the paper discusses the economics literature on pro-
motions. Section 3 contains a discussion of the data. Section 4 contains the
empirical model and results are discussed in Section 5. Concluding remarks
are found in section 6.
2 Promotions in the Economics Literature
Much of the influential work on firm hierarchies comes from single firm stud-
ies of personnel records that allow for a comprehensive examination of the
internal workings of the firm. Key early papers include Baker, Gibbs and
Holmstrom (here after BGH, 1994a, 1994b) and Lazear (1992). BGH ex-
amined twenty years of personnel data for all management employees of a
single, medium-sized U.S. firm in a service industry. They relied on observed
job transitions in the data to define levels within the firm. Since there were
many lengthy careers with movement through numerous job titles, they were
able to precisely identify the firm’s hierarchical levels. Eight levels and sev-
enteen primary job titles covered over 99% of management level employment.
1This result is related to the findings of both Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a)
and Treble, van Gameren, Bridges and Barnby (2001) who document fast-track exit ef-
fects (those promoted more quickly having a higher exit rate from the firm). Our finding
is contrary in flavor but not exactly the same for two reasons. First, we consider the
correlation between the promotion probability and reporting in the sample, not the cor-
relation between the ex post result of being promoted on firm exit. Second, individual
attrition in these data occurs when the firm does not report information on an executive
but does report on other executives. In this case, exit from the firm can either be caused
by the worker leaving the firm (either voluntary or involuntary) or by the firm simply not
reporting on an employed executive.
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Underscoring the gains to promotion, BGH (1994b) found that levels alone
explained about 70% of the variance in pay across employees in a given year.
Their results regarding promotion included: evidence of fast tracks;2 workers
promoted quickly from low levels were promoted subsequently more quickly;
the rate of promotion was higher at low levels in hierarchy;3 promotion rates
that fell with firm tenure; a positive correlation between rapid promotion
and firm exit. BGH (1994b) found evidence of serial correlation in real wage
growth for managers that persisted after accounting for observable differences
between individuals. Observable characteristics explained only part of het-
erogeneity across managers. As greater wage growth was associated with a
greater speed of promotion, BGH suggest that the presence of an unobserved
variable, such as ability, drives both promotions and wage growth.
Lazear (1992) analyzed thirteen years of personnel records from a large
manufacturing firm. Lazear’s findings included that those who changed jobs
tended to have higher starting pay upon hire and this also increased the like-
lihood of higher relative career pay. Hence, differences in starting pay well
explained differences in career earnings between workers and made starting
pay and the first job important. This account of promotions being persis-
tently influenced by factors at the time of hire is suggestive of fast-tracks.
Lazear states that workers may be sorted into their initial job assign-
ment on the basis of real differences between them (unobserved individual
heterogeneity to the researcher) or on the basis of a first impression that
nevertheless carries a career-long effect. This unanswered question regard-
ing the source of career-long advantages enjoyed by some workers relates to
explanations of promotion fast tracks in job assignment models under alter-
native assumptions and is considered in this paper. Promotion fast tracks
can result from both differences between workers in innate ability and from
the advantage gained through early initial promotion.4
2Evidence for the existence of promotion fast tracks was found also in Ariga, Ohkusa
and Brunello’s (1999) study of a Japanese firm, in the Seltzer and Merrett’s (2000) study
of the Union Bank of Australia, in Treble, van Gameren, Bridges and Barnby’s (2001)
study of large British financial sector firm, in Gibbs and Hendriks’s (2004) study of a
large US corporation and by Rosenbaum (1979). Howard and Bray (1988) found that Bell
System managers with more significant job challenges in their initial years of employment
had greater advancement at year twenty.
3Evidence of higher rates of promotion in lower hierarchical levels was also noted in
Treble, van Gameren, Bridges and Barnby (2001).
4We draw these implications from two classes of models: the case of full information
(e.g., Gibbons and Waldman, 1999) and the case of asymmetric learning (e.g., Waldman,
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One distinction made between models of job assignment is whether learn-
ing about worker ability is asymmetric. In job assignment models with asym-
metric learning of worker ability, the current employer is fully informed and
outside firms learn worker ability through the signal provided by observing
the workers current and previous job assignments. Job assignment models
with heterogeneous workers, assuming either full information or asymmetric
learning, imply serial correlation in promotion outcomes (fast-tracks) due
to differences in worker ability, with more able workers achieving promotion
more rapidly. However, in models with asymmetric learning, past promo-
tions also have an inherent effect on promotion outcomes after conditioning
on worker ability. Higher wages must be paid to workers whose promotions
signal high ability to outside firms. Since workers who have been rapidly
promoted in the past have already been signaled to be of high ability, their
subsequent promotion is less costly and, hence, speedy past promotions will
have a positive causal effect on the probability of subsequent promotion.
This implies that serial persistence in individual promotion histories may si-
multaneously result from both persistent unobserved heterogeneity and state
dependence explained by past promotion outcomes. Stated differently, fast
tracks may arise both because of differences in ability and because of the
advantage given to fast climbers.
When fast tracks arise out of differences in ability, we call this a spurious
fast track because rapid initial promotion provides no inherent advantage
in subsequent promotion. The latter reason gives rise to what we call a
causal fast track, promotions that come more quickly because of the speed of
past promotions. Our empirical method will distinguish between these two
potential sources of fast-tracks. Evidence of casual fast tracks supports the
notion of promotion signaling in the job assignment models with asymmetric
information.
This paper is related to a previous work (Belzil and Bognanno, 2010) that
had a similar central focus. It developed an empirical model of the determi-
nants of promotion given the executive’s human capital, firm scale variables,
the executive’s promotion opportunities and reporting level, unmeasured in-
dividual and firm characteristics and the effect of the speed of the worker’s
past hierarchical advancement on the prospects for current advancement.
The static model estimated found that the most influential factors explaining
the probability of a promotion were unobserved heterogeneity, the executive’s
1984, and Bernhardt, 1995).
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reporting level in the firm and the executive’s promotion opportunities. A
dynamic model of promotion examined the effects of the past speed of pro-
motion on current promotion probabilities, after conditioning on unobserved
heterogeneity. After conditioning on unobservable heterogeneity, the speed
of past advancement in level negatively influenced subsequent advancement
for most executives. For a minority of executives, past speed of advancement
aided promotion (and a fast track was found) and was associated with exec-
utives at lower levels and with lesser human capital. The overall influence of
the speed of past promotion on subsequent promotion was negligible.
There are four central improvements in this paper over the previous work
of Belzil and Bognanno (2010). First, this paper includes an analysis of the
role of functional area on promotion that was not examined previously and
has received scant attention in the economics literature. Second, the prior
paper employed advancement in reporting level towards the CEO position
as the measure of promotion. In this paper, we use changes in job titles
coupled with nominal pay grade midpoint increases to define promotion. We
show that this new definition of promotion exhibits more power in explaining
wages than the previous promotion measure. Linking promotion to changes
in job title is also more standard in the literature and gives the results greater
comparability. One difference between these alternative definitions is that the
incidence of demotions is much lower with the job title/pay grade change def-
inition. Consistent with the findings for the firm studied in BGH, demotions
appear rare in U.S. corporate data. Third, the prior paper measured past
speed of advancement in reporting level (employing the executive’s reporting
level, age and years of education to construct speed) to capture the speed
of past promotion. Because advancement in level can vary in significance
both within and across firms, the speed measure employed was not perfectly
comparable across executives. This paper measures advancement speed as
the speed of pay grade attainment (defined as the real pay grade midpoint
divided by the worker’s age) instead, a unit of measurement based on time
and money that is universal across firms and workers. Last, there is signifi-
cant attrition from the sample and to allow for the possibility that individual
sample attrition is correlated with promotion probabilities, this paper models
the response probability as a function of observed and unobserved individual
heterogeneity.
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3 Data
The proprietary panel data set used in this study provides information on
over 30,000 executives working at over 300 of the largest firms in the United
States during the period from 1981 to 1988. It was assembled by a major
compensation consulting firm based on annual surveys completed by a hu-
man resource professional at the respondent company on both the company
and individual executives. Respondent companies paid to participate in the
survey, for which they received a report on the competitiveness of their pay
levels relative to the pay levels of executives at comparable firms.5
The respondent company decided the number of executives to include
each year and whether to participate annually or on a less frequent basis.
The guidelines provided to firms suggested that they provide data on a rep-
resentative sample of at least 75 executives in a variety of job families, man-
agerial levels and organizational units. When a job title was shared by many
executives and firms did not wish to report on each, they were asked to report
on several representative cases. Respondent companies submitting data on
more than 120 executives in a given year were subject to an additional fee.
The mean number of executives reported on annually per firm was roughly
80.
The database reveals information on individual, job and firm charac-
teristics, including: age, years of education, functional area, job title, firm
tenure, base pay, bonus pay, reporting level, industry, firm profits, sales, and
employment. Gender is not available in these data. The consulting firm took
measures to ensure that the information for each individual and company
was valid and complete. All survey data were run through a series of error
checking programs and subsequently staff reviewed for follow up with the
respondent company when inconsistencies were noted. The information sub-
mitted on firm characteristics was accompanied by the respondent company’s
most recent annual report and proxy statement to ensure the consistency of
the financial data.
A unique identifier assigned to each individual allows them to be tracked
over time in their given firm. However, the movement of an individual be-
tween firms cannot be tracked as they would be assigned a new identifier
in the subsequent company. An individual’s disappearance from these data
5Published papers employing these data include Abowd (1990), Bognanno (2001) and
Belzil and Bognanno (2008).
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does not necessarily indicate an exit from the firm or a transition within the
firm, as the respondent company elects which jobs to include each year.
Promotion can be defined in various ways. In these data, the basic deci-
sion is whether the basis for promotion should be changes in the reporting
level, pay grade or job title. Firms have more job titles than pay grades and
more pay grades than reporting levels and any of these metrics can change
without necessarily causing a corresponding change in the others. As well,
not everyone in a particular class (reporting level, pay grade or job title) will
necessarily share the two alternative hierarchy measures with others in their
firm and class.
Using the reporting level as a measure of promotion is easy since it is
already ordered and was directly reported by the firms. In previous papers,
we used changes in reporting level to define promotion. The disadvantage
of reporting level is that it might change for those below the CEO if, for
instance, the firm creates a new level in the reporting hierarchy by filling a
previously nonexistent top level position. This does not constitute a demo-
tion in the sense of falling to a lesser position for those below the new level,
though adding a rung between an executive and the CEO may make the
climb to the top longer. Level changes in the data appear to be a somewhat
noisy measure and likely overstate the extent of demotions.
Using pay grade advancement to define promotion requires distinguishing
the promotion-induced advance in an executive’s pay grade midpoint from
the normal annual advance in pay grade midpoints. Programming this dis-
tinction would be difficult. Simply coding as promotions cases in which an
executive’s pay grade midpoint advanced more than the firm mean pay grade
advancement is not sufficient because pay grade midpoints do not always ad-
vance uniformly, sometimes the pay grades of higher level executives advance
more in percentage terms.
In this paper, we use job title changes to define promotion. This measure
has been widely used by others studying personnel data and enhances the
comparability of our results. The drawback is that we assume that a person’s
status in an organization cannot change as long as the job title remains the
same. Anecdotal evidence suggests that an executive’s place in the pecking
order and responsibilities in a firm may change even though the executive
continues in the same job title. Overlooking this issue, job title changes must
still be ordered on some basis to determine if they are promotions, lateral
moves or demotions.
We define promotions as changes in job title that result in the execu-
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tive being assigned a higher nominal pay grade midpoint. Lateral moves
are defined as job title changes that result in the executive being assigned
the same nominal pay grade midpoint. Demotions are defined as job title
changes that result in the executive being assigned to a lower nominal pay
grade midpoint. Non-movers have no change in their job title. Classifying
transitions into these four types shows demotions to be rare, consistent with
BGH. It is important to note that we are not defining promotions based on a
job title change and an increase in the executive’s actual base pay but rather
an increase in the pay grade. A pay grade is the specified range in which a
position’s base salary may vary and is a typical aspect of corporate salary
structures.
Table 1 provides basic summary statistics for the variables used in the
likelihood estimations that are the next step in this paper. This table limits
the sample to only executives who appear in the first and second years of the
data (1981 and 1982). This accounts for sample size differences with other
tables that do not impose this restriction. The intent of this is to show the
extent of sample attrition and the progress in earnings for executives remain-
ing in the data over the sample period. Means and standard deviations by
year are provided for compensation, promotion rates and some firm variables.
Means and standard deviations for executive characteristics in 1981 are also
reported.
Table 2 considers the importance of reporting level and job title promo-
tions in pay determination. Reporting level is measured as the number of
reporting levels an executive is from the CEO (CEO= reporting level 1). The
job title promotion index for purposes of this table is set to 0 in the first year
an executive appears in the data and is updated by +1 for subsequent pro-
motions and -1 for demotions. This gives it a structure similar to reporting
level. Of course, reporting level identifies a layer in the hierarchy of the firm
while the job title promotion index only indicates the movements up and
down in job title without specifying the executive’s position in the hierarchy.
This is evident in the top panel of Table 2 that shows the reporting level
to be more influential in pay determination. It should be noted that larger
values for reporting level indicate being further from the top of the company.
Hence, the coefficient on reporting level has a negative value. Executives one
level closer to the CEO earn 23% more in total compensation (the sum of
base and bonus pay). A one-unit rise in the promotion index increases pay
by 13%.
The bottom panel of Table 2 includes individual fixed effects. The estima-
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tion of the coefficient on reporting level is now based on executive’s changing
reporting levels in the data since the executive’s mean pay over the sample
is picked up in the individual intercept term. In this estimation, job title
changes have a much larger impact on earnings than changes in reporting
level. Job title changes are a better indicator of pay changes than changes in
reporting level after accounting for worker fixed effects. This argues in favor
considering job titles in defining promotion.
Table 3 provides pay changes and transitions between an executive’s first
and second years in the data, between the second and third years and between
the third and fourth years with the changes grouped by the executive’s initial
transition between the first and second years. Between each executive’s first
two years in the data, 90% are non-movers, 8% are promoted, 1.2% are
lateral movers and 0.7% are demoted. As might be expected, the percentage
changes in the total compensation, base pay and bonus pay are largest for
the promoted and smallest for the demoted (total compensation is merely
the sum of the base pay and annual bonus and does not include other forms
of compensation that might increase upon promotion).
Changes taking place in pay between an executive’s second and third
years and third and fourth years show that the beneficial effect of promotion
over non-movement persists but is less evident in later years. Lateral movers,
with higher rates of subsequent promotion, have the highest pay increases in
years subsequent to the initial move. The lesser pay growth for the demoted
persists but lessens in later years.
Changes taking place between an executive’s second and third years in
regards to transitions show that those who moved previously are more likely
to have subsequent moves. Non-movers initially have about a 90% chance of
remaining non-movers. Those with an initial change in job title combined
with any type of movement in pay grade are substantially more likely to be
promoted subsequently. The demoted are much more likely to be demoted
again. Even in the year just following a promotion, the promoted executives
have promotion probabilities about 75% greater than non-movers (13.8%
versus 7.9%). This differential persists two years after promotion, initially
promoted executives are 70% more likely than non-movers to be promoted
between years three and four (15.1% versus 8.9%). The higher subsequent
rate of promotion for those promoted between their first two years in the raw
data is in accord with the notion of fast tracks, higher rates of subsequent
promotion for those promoted previously. It’s surprising that fast tracks
appear evident even in regards to the in sample promotions in the very next
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year for experienced executives occupying jobs at top reporting levels in
the firm where longer tenure in position might be expected before another
promotion.
Table 4 considers variables that might serve as leading indicators of pro-
motion. Executives are grouped according to the transition they experience
between their second and third year in the data. Transitions between the sec-
ond and third years are used to allow pay changes to be constructed based
on prior data (years one and two). The sample is restricted to executives
present for at least three consecutive years. It is evident from the table that
promoted executives received larger pay increases prior to promotion, fol-
lowed by lateral movers and non-movers. The demoted between years two
and three also received the smallest pay increases between years one and two.
Table 4 also shows that promoted executives tend to be younger and
have less firm tenure prior to promotion. The promoted are followed in
youth and inexperience by lateral movers and non-movers. These findings
alone would say little about fast tracks since promotions are more frequent at
the lower levels in the firm occupied by younger workers. However, promoted
executives also tend to be younger than average among workers in their same
job and firm prior to promotion. While the differences in age minus the
firm/job mean age are small, less than a full year, this is consistent with the
operation of fast tracks. Also consistent with fast tracks, the promoted spent
the least time in their positions prior to promotion while the non-movers
spent the most time. Differences between the groups in education are slight
but orderly. The promoted are the most educated and the demoted are the
least educated. All three classes of job title changers were likely to have had
a prior job title change, particularly a previous promotion. Age, education,
tenure and level are included in the formal empirical models of promotion to
follow.
4 Econometric Model
We build a dynamic model of promotion in which the probability of promo-
tion at a point in time is a function of individual and firm characteristics and
the executive’s career advancement speed. We model individual unobserved
heterogeneity in a flexible way to account for persistent characteristics un-
observed by the econometrician that affect promotions (like innate ability or
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motivation).6
Our model addresses two important issues. The first one is the so called
initial condition problem. The initial level at which the worker is observed
in a firm is likely to be influenced by permanent unobserved factors that also
affect the subsequent movement of the worker in the firm. We address this
issue using Wooldridge’s (2005) method by conditioning on the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity on the initial level. The second issue concerns
endogenous attrition. As shown in Table 1, a significant number of executives
leave the sample each year. Dropping out of the sample at a point in time is
caused either by the firm not participating in the survey at all or not reporting
on an executive still with the firm or no longer with the firm. As mentioned
in the data section, firms were asked to report on a representative sample
of jobs, levels and units. In the case of job titles with multiple incumbents,
several representative cases were requested. Job transitions might affect both
the probability of the individual exiting the firm (a link between promotion
and firm exits exists in the literature) and of being sampled in the case of
continued employment (the likelihood of being sampled in the firm appears
to rise at higher levels). For these reasons, sample attrition not due to firm
non-participation is likely to be related to persistent individual factors that
also affect promotion outcomes, making it endogenous. We therefore write
the response probability (i.e. the probability that the worker is still present
in the sample) as a function of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution and
include the non-response probability in the individual’s contribution to the
likelihood when the firm is participating in the survey but not reporting on
a particular executive.
We turn now to a formal description of the model. We first describe the
promotion probabilities and then turn to attrition and unobserved hetero-
geneity. Finally, we write the likelihood function that is estimated.
4.1 Promotion Probability
As already stated, the promotion indicator at year t is defined as a job title
change associated with a higher nominal pay grade midpoint between the
year t− 1 and year t.
6As already stated, movements of individuals across firms can not be identified. There-
fore, we can not distinguish individual from firm persistent attributes. Without loss of
generality, we refer to unobserved factors as individual specific.
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The probability that individual i, belonging to firm j is promoted at year
t is defined by the following equation:
Pr(Yijt = 1) = Λ(βrrmidageijt−1 + βqLqit−1 + βPOPOijt−1 + βF1Fjt−1
+ βF2(Fjt − Fjt−1) + βUUt−1 + αi),
where:
• Λ(.) is the logistic cumulative distribution function.
• rmidageijt−1 is the real pay grade midpoint divided by the executive’s
age. This variable measures the career advancement speed including
the impact of recent in-sample promotions.
• Lqit−1 is a set of binary variables indicating the reporting level of the
executive in the firm. The value of the level, denoted q, is the number of
reporting levels an executive is from the CEO position (level 1). Level
6 (or more) is the reference group and level 1 is not included because
CEOs cannot be promoted internally.
• POijt−1 measures the promotion opportunities in the firm. This vari-
able is defined as the percentage of executives hired from outside the
firm into positions above the given worker.
• Fjt is a set of firm-specific variables. It includes profits, sales and total
employment. The difference in these variables between periods t − 1
and t is also included.
• Ut−1 is the national unemployment rate. This variable allows general
labor market conditions to be taken into account. It is possible that
the state of the labor market or the state of business cycle will have an
influence on turnover, hiring and promotions even after controlling for
firm profits, sales and employment.
• αi is an individual specific term that represents individual unobserved
heterogeneity. In order to resolve the initial condition problem, we spec-
ify its distribution conditional on the initial level (Wooldridge, 2005).
Therefore, this term is decomposed into the sum of a regression com-
ponent and an orthogonal unobserved component. More precisely, it
takes the following form:
αi = αXXi0 + αrrmidagei0 + αUUiH + αFAFAi0 + α˜i (1)
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where:
– Xi0 contains human capital variables (age, education and tenure)
and an indicator for newcomer status in the firm. All of these
variables are measured as of the individual’s first observation in
the sample, that is before the first observable promotion occurs.
– rmidagei0 is the real pay grade midpoint divided by the execu-
tive’s age also measured as of the executive’s first observation in
the sample. It captures the executive’s prior career speed of ad-
vancement as of the start date in the sample. Including it allows
the effect of the prior speed of advancement to be isolated from
the effect of in-sample promotions to determine if in-sample pro-
motions have a casual effect on subsequent promotion or whether
fast tracks result only due to the greater prior career speed of ad-
vancement. In-sample promotions were shown to lead to a greater
likelihood of subsequent promotion in the raw data.
– UiH is the yearly national unemployment rate measured at the
time the executive was hired by the firm. This variable captures a
potential long-lasting effect of labor market conditions when the
individual entered the firm.
– FAi0 is a set of binary variables indicating the functional area to
which the executive belongs at the beginning of the sample period.
Differences in promotability based on functional area have been
found in the management literature.
– α˜i is the orthogonal unobserved component; its distribution is
defined more precisely below.
4.2 Response Probability
As noted previously, attrition for an executive is caused either by the firm
not participating in the survey or by the firm participating but not report-
ing on the particular executive. In our framework, we consider attrition as
endogenous only when it is due to the latter reason. Attrition due to firm
non-participation in the survey is considered as exogenous and is not included
in the contribution to the likelihood.
The response probability at each period is written as a function of indi-
vidual characteristics (the same unobserved heterogeneity component as in
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the promotion probability) and the variation of the number of executives re-
ported by the firm from the previous period. More precisely, the probability
that worker i, belonging to firm j, is observed at year t is determined by the
following expression:
Pr(Zijt = 1) = Λ(δn%∆nbobsjt + γi),
where:
• %∆nbobsjt is the relative variation of the number of workers reported
by firm j between years t− 1 and t.
• γi is an individual specific term that represents individual unobserved
heterogeneity. Its expression takes a form close to the one adopted for
αi:
γi = γXXi0 + γrrmidagei0 + γUUiH + γFAFAi0 + γ˜i,
where Xi0, rmidagei0, UiH and FAi0 are the same set of variables
as defined before, and γ˜i is the orthogonal unobserved component. γ˜i
shares the same distribution as α˜i, which is defined below. Endogeneity
of attrition is thus corrected by allowing the same unobserved individual
specific factors to affect promotion and response probabilities.
4.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
In order to minimize the impact of distributional assumptions needed to
implement this model, we assume that α˜i and γ˜i are characterized by an un-
known cumulative distribution function, H(.), that is approximated using a
discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). The probability associated
with type k is
pk = Pr(α˜i = αk, γ˜i = γk),
where k = 1, . . . , K. The optimal number of types, K, is determined from
the minimization of the Bayesian Information Criterion when the model is
estimated with K ranging between 2 and 6. The type probability, pk, is
estimated using a logistic transform:
pk =
exp qk∑K
s=1 exp qs
k = 1, . . . , K,
where qks are parameters to be estimated with the restriction that qK = 0.
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4.4 Likelihood Function
For a given year, the individual’s contribution to the likelihood is the product
of the response probability and the promotion probability. When the worker
leaves the sample, he contributes to the likelihood only if this non-reporting
results from the firm’s decision to not participate in the survey at all. There-
fore, the likelihood for an individual i of type k who is observed during s
periods, s = 1, . . . , 7, takes the following form:
Lsi (k) =
s∏
t=1
[
Pr(Zijt(k) = 1) · (Pr(Yijt(k) = 1))dit · (1− Pr(Yijt(k) = 1))1−dit
]
· (1− Pr(Zijs+1(k) = 1))(atti).
When the individual is only observed at the initial period and thus has no
promotion observation, s = 0, the likelihood function appears as:
L0i (k) = (1− Pr(Zij1(k) = 1))(atti)
The variable dit is an indicator taking the value 1 if the individual is observed
at period t and atti is the attrition indicator variable equal to 1 when the
worker has no observation at period t and the firm is participating in the
survey. Therefore, the likelihood of an individual of type k is the following:
Li(k) =
7∏
s=0
[(Lsi (k))
eis ],
where eis is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the individual i is
observed during s periods.
As a consequence, the mixed likelihood, for an individual i, is simply:
Li =
K∑
k=1
pk · Li(k).
The model is estimated by maximization of the sum of all individual (mixed)
log likelihoods.
5 Empirical Results: The Determinants of
Promotion
The first step of our analysis is devoted to the model specification in which
we distinguish between the spurious and the causal fast-track effects. As
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explained earlier, the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity includes a
variable (rmidage0) that measures individual earnings achievements per year
(real pay grade midpoint divided by age) as recorded when the individual
enters the sample. This variable therefore captures the spurious fast-track
effect whereas the variable (rmidaget), which measures past advancement up
to year t, captures the causal fast-track effect.
We estimated several different versions of the model. These included
specifications that modeled attrition and those that ignored the potential
endogeneity of non-response. We also estimated both a static version of the
model (with no causal fast-track) and a dynamic version. All versions were
estimated with the unobserved heterogeneity distribution ranging from two
to six types.
For brevity, we focus our presentation on the model that includes two
types, which is the optimal number of types according to the Bayesian In-
formation Criterion (values are provided in Table 5). Because virtually all
models that incorporate an explicit modeling of non-response indicate a non-
trivial degree of correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity component
affecting non-response and the heterogeneity affecting promotions, we also
focus on the model in which non-response (sample attrition) is endogenous.
The results are reported in three tables. The parameter estimates as well
as their associated marginal effects on promotion probability are in Table 6.
In Table 7, we report a variance decomposition of the promotion probability
that allows the explanatory power of sets of variables to be examined (unob-
served heterogeneity, in-sample career advancement speed, functional area,
individual characteristics, reporting level, firm characteristics and the unem-
ployment rate). Finally, in Table 8, we report measures of the correlation
between the unobserved heterogeneity components explaining promotion and
response and the correlation between promotion probability and response at
period four. This allows the link between promotability and remaining in
the sample (response) to be examined.
5.1 Investigating the Importance of Structural Fast-
Tracks versusUnobserved Heterogeneity
The first striking result is the coexistence of the very weak negative effect of
the in-sample career advancement speed on subsequent promotion (the struc-
tural fast-track) with the strong positive effect of the initially observed career
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advancement speed in the initial condition equation on subsequent promo-
tion (the spurious fast-track). The parameter estimate for the structural
fast-track, -0.0763, implies that, after conditioning on unobserved hetero-
geneity, there is small negative effect on the promotion probability of -0.0029
for each 1,000 dollar gain in the pay grade midpoint per year.7 However,
the lifetime yearly gain in the pay grade midpoint measured at the start of
the sample is the main component of the unobserved heterogeneity equa-
tion, with a parameter estimate of 0.5014, and a marginal effect that is more
than six times greater. An increase in the average initial pay grade midpoint
per year of $1,000 increases the promotion probability by 0.019. In-sample
promotions were associated with a substantial increase in the likelihood of
subsequent promotion in the raw data. However, after conditioning on un-
observed individual heterogeneity, there is no evidence that in-sample pay
grade advancement increases subsequent promotion probabilities. This sug-
gests that promotions, defined as a job change accompanied by an increase
in the pay grade midpoint, in themselves do not have an inherent causal ben-
efit on subsequent promotions, at least for relatively senior executives. It is
possible that early career promotions could yet have a signaling aspect that
would provide a benefit in subsequent promotions. Interestingly, in results
available from the authors, in a model similar to the one presented but inter-
acting in-sample pay grade advancement with reporting level, the interaction
of in-sample advancement with the lowest reporting level examined (level 6)
did have a positive and significant marginal effect on promotion probabili-
ties. The interaction at reporting level 2 was negative and significant and
the interactions between these levels were insignificant. The results for level
6 hint that an aspect of promotion signaling may exist at lower levels with
younger workers. Overall, the results here strongly suggest that the source
of widely noted executive fast tracks is unobserved individual factors, such
as worker ability.
The standard human capital variables, such as age, education, and tenure,
have a very limited impact on promotion. Education and firm tenure have a
weak positive influence on promotion probabilities. Age and newcomer status
have a weak negative effect. The marginal effects of age, newcomer status,
education and tenure are –0.0013, -0.0068, 0.0014 and 0.0002 respectively.8
7In comparison, Belzil and Bognanno 2010 reported a negative causal fast track effect
for the majority of the population with an almost negligible magnitude.
8Howard and Bray (1988) found a college degree to be the best predictor of promotion.
Forbes and Piercy (1991, p. 165) find that the time to the CEO position is reduced through
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The parameter estimates on the levels in the firm indicate that promotion
probabilities diminish at the more senior levels.
5.2 Labor Market Conditions
As mentioned earlier, our model takes into account the effect on promotion
of both current labor market conditions and labor market conditions at the
time the executive was hired. However, we find these measures have a min-
imal effect. The current rate of unemployment has a very slight dampening
effect on promotion after accounting for firm profit, sales and employment.
The marginal effect is -0.0016. The unemployment rate measured when the
executive was hired has no significant effect.
5.3 Analysis of Functional Area
The potential role of functional area has received little empirical or theoreti-
cal attention in the economics literature. However, this topic has appeared in
the management literature. Vroom and MacCrimmon (1968) found that pro-
motion opportunities varied with functional area and were better in finance
and marketing. Forbes and Piercy (1991) found that the functional area
backgrounds of CEOs varied by industry and, with regards to the eventual
CEOs, the time to reach various top positions in the organization varied by
functional area. At the outset, it should be clear that our objective is not to
treat functional area as an endogenous choice variable. We treat functional
area as an element of the initial endogenous condition.
Our analysis is based on two possible interpretations. First, if firms assign
individuals to functional areas based on skills and factors that are correlated
with factors explaining promotability, we may expect the initial functional
area to account for a non-trivial share of persistent unobserved heterogeneity.
A second possibility, more in line with functional area having a causal effect,
is that individuals move across different possible functional areas during their
careers, targeting those areas that are known to provide better promotion
opportunities. If so, the promotion process should display serial correlation,
even after conditioning on unobserved heterogeneity.
Although we cannot distinguish between these two hypotheses, both of
them imply that after some elapsed career duration, the prevailing functional
higher levels of education. Useem and Karabel (1986) show the importance of earning a
degree from an elite institution when the executive is not from elite social origins.
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area of a given executive is likely to exhibit some correlation with subsequent
promotion outcomes.
It is particularly interesting to note the degree of asymmetry in the ef-
fect and the level of significance of functional area indicators. The estimates
indicate that those who work in marketing services, management areas and
manufacturing seem to have a clear advantage in terms of future promotions.
In terms of marginal effects, these estimates imply a higher annual promo-
tion probability of 0.0177 for management, 0.016 for marketing and 0.0124 for
manufacturing, relative to a material position (the reference functional area).
The three weakest functional areas for promotion were employee relations,
legal and management information systems. That differences in promotion
probabilities by functional area exist came to light in the management liter-
ature and are confirmed here.
5.4 Decomposing Promotion Probabilities
In order to assess the relative importance of each group of explanatory fac-
tors, we decompose the index function of the promotion probability. The
explanatory power of each group of variables is measured by the R2 of the
regression of the promotion index function on the given group of variables.
Results reported in Table 7 show that 70.6% of the total variation in promo-
tion probabilities is explained by persistent unobserved heterogeneity. The
next most important set of variable, age, education, tenure, newcomer status
in the firm and unemployment upon hire, accounts for 8.3%. The functional
areas account for 5.4%. Firm variables (sales, profits and employment mea-
sured in levels and changes) and the indicator of promotion opportunities
seem to have only a minimal explanatory power, as they explain only 3.3%
of the variation. Initially observed career advancement speed accounts for
2.0%. Career advancement speed updated each sample year acounts for 1.6%.
Reporting level and the in-sample unemployment rate each account for 0.5%.
So, clearly, unobservable factors are much more influential than the factors
that we are able to observe.
We also find a large correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity
components of promotion outcomes and response probabilities in Table 8.
The correlation is positive and equal to 0.467. This means that, ceteris
paribus, those who are more likely to be promoted are also more likely to
remain in the sample.
To summarize, the empirical evidence displayed in Tables 6, 7 and 8, as
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well as results obtained from specifications that are not reported, suggest
that the promotion process may be summarized by a static discrete outcome
model, where all serial correlation is accounted for by persistent individual
unobserved factors.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a dynamic reduced-form model of promotions
on a panel of high-level executives employed in over 300 U.S.corporations.
Promotion is defined as a change in job title resulting in a higher pay grade
midpoint. The promotion probability is written as a function of variables
taken at their value when the individual is first observed in the sample,
including observed individual characteristics (age, education, tenure, and
newcomer status in the firm), the initially observed career advancement speed
in pay grade, the unemployment rate and functional area, and variables that
are updated each sample year, including career advancement speed, reporting
level, firm characteristics and labor market conditions. The specification
controls for unobserved individual heterogeneity and allows an endogenous
initial condition and endogenous sample attrition.
Many studies in the personnel literature have found evidence of fast
tracks. Executives observed being promoted quickly appear to have more
rapid subsequent promotions. Evidence consistent with this notion was found
here in a simple examination of the raw data in that executives with an in-
sample promotion were more likely to receive a subsequent promotion. The
cause of this phenomena has been hypothesized to result from the potential
signaling effect of promotion but also simply from the persistent benefit of
a promoted executive being of higher ability. No evidence is found in this
paper that an executive’s speed of advancement in pay grade updated each
sample year has a positive causal impact on promotions after conditioning on
the executive’s past career speed of advancement. In fact, the in-sample ca-
reer advancement speed has a weakly negative marginal effect on promotion.
For high-level executives, fast tracks appear to result from heterogeneity in
persistent individual characteristics, not from an inherent benefit in the re-
cent advancement itself. Thus, the notion of fast tracks resulting from the
persistent benefit of being of high ability is supported over the notion that
fast tracks result from the signaling effect of promotions.
The large majority of the variation in promotion probabilities is explained
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by persistent unobserved individual heterogeneity, about 71%. All observ-
able variables combined, including age, education, tenure, functional area,
reporting level, the unemployment rate and firm profits, sales and employ-
ment, account for just over 20% of the variation in promotion probabilities.
This would make predicting promotion purely on the basis of observable char-
acteristics for senior executives difficult. It is impossible to know the extent
to which richer information is known within the firm that would make pro-
motion predictions easier to make. Uncertainty in regards to promotion may
serve the firm’s interests if promotion tournament incentives are beneficial.
The management literature noted long ago that differences in promotion
existed across functional areas. Our results support this finding. Promotion
probabilities differ by functional area for executives at the same reporting
level and firm. Executives initially observed in marketing, management and
manufacturing had higher annual promotion probabilities. Those in employee
relations, legal and management information systems had lesser annual pro-
motion probabilities. The differences in promotion probabilities by functional
area were evident even after controlling for observable individual character-
istics. The different functional areas as a group account for about 5% of the
variation in promotion probabilities.
In terms of future research, along the lines of the work of DeVaro and
Waldman (2012), it would be interesting to see if the wage change upon
promotion is the largest for those workers who appear ex ante to be the least
likely to be promoted. Theoretically, a promotion in these cases should send
the strongest signal to the outside labor market and force the largest wage
increase from the current firm.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Sample Used in the Estimations
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Individuals 13,113 13,113 8,728 6,280 4,400 2,864 2,053 1,435
Compensation Variables
Total Compensation 7.8 8.1 8.5 9.4 10.2 10.6 11.7 12.9
(units of 10,000 1980USD) (6.9) (7.2) (7.3) (8.2) (9.3) (9.8) (11.3) (12.5)
Mean Base Pay 6.2 6.4 6.9 7.4 7.8 8.1 8.6 9.3
(units of 10,000 1980USD) (4.3) (4.5) (4.9) (5.3) (5.8) (6.1) (6.3) (7.0)
Mean Bonus 1.6 1.7 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.5 3.2 3.6
(units of 10,000 1980USD) (3.0) (3.1) (2.8) (3.4) (4.1) (4.2) (5.8) (6.0)
Changes in Firm Variables and Promotion Rates
%∆sales 2.9% 2.1% 0.1% 7.3% -0.5% 10.2% 5.3%
(22%) (44%) (15%) (13%) (26%) (101%) (11%)
%∆profits 11% 28% 46% 84% 60% -3% 143%
(88%) (610%) (291%) (422%) (915%) (252%) (812%)
%∆employment 2.1% 1.5% 0.1% 4.4% 1.2% 5.7% 1.8%
(19%) (36%) (13%) (19%) (19%) (79%) (14%)
Annual Mean Promotion∗ 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.26)
Executive Characteristics in 1981
Firm Tenure 15.1 (10.5)
Reporting Level 4.3 (1.4)
Years in Position 4.0 (3.9)
Age 47.4 (8.7)
Education 16.2 (1.9)
∗ The promotion indicator takes the value 1 if the executive experiences a change in
job title associated with a higher pay grade midpoint, 0 if not.
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Table 2: Level versus Job Title in Pay Determination
OLS
Dependent ln (Total
ln (Base Pay)
Variable Compensation)
Intercept 12.08*** (0.005) 11.78*** (0.004)
Job Title Promotion Index 0.13*** (0.004) 0.10*** (0.003)
Reporting Level -0.23*** (0.001) -0.20*** (0.001)
N 107,359 107,359
R2 0.30 0.31
Individual Fixed Effects
Dependent ln (Total
ln (Base Pay)
Variable Compensation)
Job Title Promotion Index 0.15*** (0.001) 0.13*** (0.001)
Reporting Level -0.02*** (0.001) -0.02*** (0.001)
N 107,359 107,359
R2 0.97 0.98
Note 1: The job title promotion index is set to 0 in the first year an executive appears
in the data and is updated by +1 for subsequent promotions and -1 for demotions.
Note 2: Standard errors under parenthesis. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
28
Table 3: Pay and Transition Outcomes Subsequent to Initial Transition
Transition between
Non-Mover Promoted Lateral Mover Demoted
years 1 and 2
New job title New job title New job title
Transition Same job & higher & same & lower
Definition title nominal nominal nominal
pay grade pay grade pay grade
% of sample 90.1% 8.0% 1.2% 0.7%
∆ Years 1 and 2: Initial Pay Changes and Transitions
%∆Total Compensation 5.4% 11.4% 7.0% 2.9%
%∆Base Pay 3.2% 9.2% 5.2% 1.6%
%∆Bonus 23.7% 28.1% 14.3% 3.1%
%∆Pay Grade Midpoint 8.1% 19.2% 0.0% -10.0%
Non-Mover 100.0%
Promoted 100.0%
Lateral Mover 100.0%
Demoted 100.0%
N (total=28,162) 25,380 2,247 348 187
∆ Years 2 and 3: Subsequent Pay Changes and Transitions
by Initial Transition Outcome
%∆Total Compensation 3.8% 6.7% 7.0% 3.3%
%∆Base Pay 4.4% 5.4% 5.9% 4.0%
%∆Bonus 10.0% 19.5% 28.0% 0.0%
%∆Pay Grade Midpoint 6.9% 7.1% 12.9% 19.5%
Non-Mover 89.8% 81.1% 77.6% 81.5%
Promoted 7.9% 13.8% 17.1% 16.7%
Lateral Mover 1.6% 3.5% 3.3% 0.0%
Demoted 0.8% 1.7% 1.9% 13.5%
N (total=17,954) 16,126 1,510 210 108
∆ Years 3 and 4: Subsequent Pay Changes and Transitions
by Initial Transition Outcome
%∆Total Compensation 6.8% 8.3% 9.2% 5.3%
%∆Base Pay 4.4% 5.7% 5.5% 3.0%
%∆Bonus 26.7% 29.4% 18.1% 6.5%
%∆Pay Grade Midpoint 7.3% 9.1% 9.3% 10.7%
Non-Mover 89.4% 82.0% 72.4% 78.8%
Promoted 8.9% 15.1% 18.1% 19.7%
Lateral Mover 0.9% 1.6% 5.2% 1.5%
Demoted 0.7% 1.3% 4.3% 0.0%
N (total=12,164) 10,942 1,040 116 66
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Table 4: Potential Leading Indicators of Promotion: Prior Pay, Human Capital
and Transitions
Transition between
Non-Mover Promoted Lateral Mover Demoted
Years 2 and 3
New job title New job title New job title
Transition Same job & higher & same & lower
Definition title nominal nominal nominal
pay grade pay grade pay grade
% of sample 88.9% 8.5% 1.8% 0.9%
N (total=17,954) 15,957 1,529 315 153
∆ Years 1 and 2: Compensation Variables
%∆Total Compensation 6.3% 8.4% 7.0% 5.4%
∆Total Compensation $4,460 $6,342 $4,860 $5,472
%∆Base Pay 4.0% 5.4% 3.5% 3.2%
∆Base Pay $2,414 $3,465 $1,894 $2,435
%∆Bonus 26.6% 24.6% 34.0% 20.7%
∆Bonus $2,045 $2,877 $2,966 $3,036
%∆Pay Grade Midpoint 9.0% 9.9% 10.7% 11.0%
∆Pay Grade Midpoint $6,588 $7,438 $7,617 $9,857
Year 2: Compensation Variables Minus Mean for Firm, Year, Job Title
Total Comp − Job Mean $410 $1,178 $3,126 $2,781
Base Pay − Job Mean $93 $596 $1,053 $2,167
Bonus − Job Mean $342 $653 $2,073 $614
Base − Grade Midpoint* -$1,553 -$1,121 -$2,389 -$5,642
Year 2: Human Capital Variables
Age 47.3 44.8 46.7 48.3
Age − Job Mean -0.04 -0.80 -0.30 -0.14
Years in Position(inpost) 4.1 2.9 3.0 3.1
Inpost − Job Mean -0.02 -0.26 -0.07 -0.11
Age − Education − 5 25.9 23.3 25.3 27.0
Tenure 14.8 13.2 14.4 15.2
Education 16.4 16.5 16.4 16.3
Reporting Level:1=CEO 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.0
Prior Transition between Years 1 and 2
Non-Mover 90.8% 82.9% 81.0% 79.7%
Promoted 7.7% 13.6% 16.8% 16.3%
Lateral Mover 1.0% 2.4% 2.2% 2.6%
Demoted 0.6% 1.2% 0.0% 1.3%
* Only 43% of executives receive base pay at or above their real pay grade midpoint.
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Table 5: Bayesian Information Criterion Values for Model Selection
log(L) BIC
1 type -58,411.93 11,7299.92
2 types -58,324.39 11,7155.89
3 types -58,315.47 11,7169.09
4 types -58,315.01 11,7199.21
5 types -58,314.67 11,7229.59
6 types -58,314.15 11,7259.59
31
T
a
b
le
6
:
P
ar
am
et
er
E
st
im
at
es
an
d
M
ar
gi
n
al
E
ff
ec
ts
P
a
ra
m
et
er
s
M
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
(S
.E
.)
(S
.E
.)
U
n
o
b
se
rv
e
d
h
e
te
ro
g
e
n
e
it
y
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
p
a
ra
m
e
te
rs
q 1
1
.1
4
0
6
*
*
*
(0
.1
4
5
1
)
-
P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
T
im
e-
in
va
ri
a
n
t
u
n
o
bs
er
ve
d
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
In
te
rc
ep
t
ty
p
e
1
(α˜
1
)
-2
.4
2
5
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
4
5
)
-
In
te
rc
ep
t
ty
p
e
2
(α˜
2
)
-0
.8
4
8
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
1
6
)
-
E
xe
cu
ti
ve
’s
ti
m
e-
in
va
ri
a
n
t
o
bs
er
ve
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
A
ge
-0
.3
3
7
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
4
4
)
-0
.0
0
1
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
01
)
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
0
.3
6
9
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
1
2
)
0
.0
0
1
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
T
en
u
re
0
.0
3
9
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
0
.0
0
0
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
00
)
N
ew
co
m
er
-0
.1
9
4
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
4
2
)
-0
.0
0
6
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
In
it
ia
ll
y
ob
se
rv
ed
ca
re
er
ad
va
n
ce
m
en
t
sp
ee
d
(i
n
$
1
,0
0
0
s)
0
.5
0
1
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
9
5
)
0
.0
1
9
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
21
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
at
h
ir
in
g
-0
.0
0
4
7
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
-0
.0
0
0
2
(0
.0
0
02
)
F
u
n
ct
io
n
al
ar
ea
:
L
eg
al
-0
.2
6
3
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
2
6
)
-0
.0
0
8
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
E
m
p
lo
ye
e
re
la
ti
on
s
-0
.3
1
7
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
1
5
)
-0
.0
1
0
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
0
.2
8
5
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
3
0
)
0
.0
1
2
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
M
ar
ke
ti
n
g
0
.3
5
6
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
3
0
)
0
.0
1
6
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
F
in
an
ce
-0
.0
3
4
8
*
(0
.0
1
9
0
)
-0
.0
0
1
3
*
(0
.0
0
07
)
M
an
ag
em
en
t
in
fo
sy
st
em
s
-0
.2
3
4
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
3
7
)
-0
.0
0
8
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
R
es
ea
rc
h
/
en
gi
n
ee
ri
n
g
0
.1
3
9
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
4
2
)
0
.0
0
5
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
15
)
P
u
b
li
c
/
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
re
la
ti
o
n
s
-0
.0
0
2
9
(0
.0
4
1
3
)
-0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.0
0
16
)
G
en
er
al
m
an
ag
em
en
t
0
.3
8
8
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
5
7
)
0
.0
1
7
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
M
at
er
ia
l,
p
u
rc
h
as
in
g,
w
ar
eh
o
u
si
n
g
re
f.
re
f.
C
a
re
er
a
d
va
n
ce
m
en
t
sp
ee
d
u
pd
a
te
d
ea
ch
sa
m
p
le
ye
a
r
(i
n
$1
,0
0
0
s)
-0
.0
7
6
3
*
*
(0
.0
3
1
8
)
-0
.0
0
2
9
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
L
ev
el
in
th
e
fi
rm
L
ev
el
2
-0
.3
7
1
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
7
8
)
-0
.0
1
1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
14
)
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
ag
e
32
T
a
b
le
6
:
C
on
ti
n
u
ed
P
a
ra
m
et
er
s
M
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
(S
.E
.)
(S
.E
.)
L
ev
el
3
-0
.1
0
7
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
1
6
)
-0
.0
0
3
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
07
)
L
ev
el
4
0
.1
0
9
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
6
8
)
0
.0
0
3
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
L
ev
el
5
0
.0
8
6
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
0
2
)
0
.0
0
3
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
L
ev
el
6
re
f.
re
f.
F
ir
m
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
P
ro
m
ot
io
n
op
p
or
tu
n
it
ie
s
0
.1
7
2
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
0
.0
0
6
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
06
)
S
al
es
(i
n
$1
M
)
-0
.0
1
6
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
-0
.0
0
0
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
%
∆
sa
le
s
-0
.0
0
0
8
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
0
.0
0
0
0
(0
.0
0
00
)
P
ro
fi
t
(i
n
$1
0,
00
0)
0
.0
0
0
4
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
0
.0
0
0
0
(0
.0
0
00
)
∆
p
ro
fi
t
(i
n
$1
0,
00
0)
0
.0
0
3
2
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
0
.0
0
0
1
*
*
(0
.0
0
00
)
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
(i
n
10
,0
00
)
-0
.0
2
8
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
-0
.0
0
1
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
%
∆
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
0
.0
0
3
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
0
.0
0
0
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
00
)
L
a
bo
r
m
a
rk
et
co
n
d
it
io
n
s
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
-0
.0
4
3
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
9
3
)
-0
.0
0
1
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
R
e
sp
o
n
se
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
T
im
e-
in
va
ri
a
n
t
u
n
o
bs
er
ve
d
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
In
te
rc
ep
t
ty
p
e
1
(γ˜
1
)
1
.3
9
8
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
7
8
)
-
In
te
rc
ep
t
ty
p
e
2
(γ˜
2
)
1
.7
0
6
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
5
8
)
-
E
xe
cu
ti
ve
’s
ti
m
e-
in
va
ri
a
n
t
o
bs
er
ve
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
A
ge
-0
.0
6
1
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
-0
.0
0
1
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
02
)
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
0
.1
2
1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
8
9
)
0
.0
0
2
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
T
en
u
re
0
.0
1
1
9
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
0
.0
0
0
2
(0
.0
0
0
1
)
N
ew
co
m
er
-0
.0
2
6
8
(0
.0
3
4
7
)
-0
.0
0
4
8
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
In
it
ia
ll
y
ob
se
rv
ed
ca
re
er
ad
va
n
ce
m
en
t
sp
ee
d
(i
n
$
1
,0
0
0
s)
0
.1
9
6
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
2
3
)
0
.0
3
4
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
22
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
at
h
ir
in
g
-0
.0
5
0
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
-0
.0
0
8
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
F
u
n
ct
io
n
al
ar
ea
:
L
eg
al
0
.3
2
5
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
0
.0
5
2
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
58
)
E
m
p
lo
ye
e
re
la
ti
on
s
0
.0
3
7
6
*
(0
.0
1
9
5
)
0
.0
0
6
6
*
(0
.0
0
34
)
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
ag
e
33
T
a
b
le
6
:
C
on
ti
n
u
ed
P
a
ra
m
et
er
s
M
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
(S
.E
.)
(S
.E
.)
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
-0
.1
2
4
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
9
9
)
-0
.0
2
2
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
37
)
M
ar
ke
ti
n
g
-0
.3
4
1
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
0
5
)
-0
.0
6
5
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
F
in
an
ce
0
.0
9
6
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
3
8
)
0
.0
1
7
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
M
an
ag
em
en
t
in
fo
sy
st
em
s
-0
.2
3
1
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
9
5
)
-0
.0
4
3
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
R
es
ea
rc
h
/
en
gi
n
ee
ri
n
g
-0
.1
7
3
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
5
3
)
-0
.0
3
2
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
49
)
P
u
b
li
c
/
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
re
la
ti
o
n
s
0
.1
3
1
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
6
3
)
0
.0
2
2
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
59
)
G
en
er
al
m
an
ag
em
en
t
-0
.2
2
4
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
0
0
)
-0
.0
4
2
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
79
)
M
at
er
ia
l,
p
u
rc
h
as
in
g,
w
ar
eh
o
u
si
n
g
re
f.
re
f.
F
ir
m
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
%
∆
n
b
ob
s
-0
.0
1
3
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
-0
.0
0
2
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
01
)
In
d
iv
id
u
al
s
2
9
,4
5
3
M
ea
n
lo
g-
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
-1
.8
6
8
N
ot
e
1:
M
ar
gi
n
al
eff
ec
ts
ar
e
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
t
th
e
m
ea
n
s
a
n
d
m
o
d
es
o
f
co
va
ri
a
te
s,
fo
r
ty
p
e
1
s.
N
ot
e
2:
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
ve
ls
:
**
*
1%
;
*
*
5
%
;
*
1
0
%
.
34
Table 7: Variance Decomposition of the Promotion Probability
Time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 0.706
Initially observed career advancement speed (in $1,000s) 0.020
Functional area 0.054
Age, education, tenure, new comer status, unemployment at time of hire 0.083
Career advancement speed updated each sample year 0.016
Reporting level in the firm 0.005
Firm characteristics 0.033
Unemployment rate 0.005
All variables 0.907
Note 1: The variance decomposition is performed on all individuals observed at pe-
riod 4.
Note 2: The share of the variance explained by each factor is measured by the R2 of
the predicted promotion probability regressed on the variables associated to the factor.
Table 8: Correlation Between Promotability and Response
corr(αi,γi) 0.467
corr(Pr(Yij4 = 1),Pr(Zij4 = 1)) 0.268
Note: The first line corresponds to the coefficient of correlation between the executive’s
time-invariant specific (unobserved and observed) components of promotion and response
probabilities. The second line corresponds to the coefficient of correlation between the
probabilities of promotion and response at period 4.
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